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CORPORATIONS, CLASSES, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
AFTER MANAGERIALISM 
ABSTRACT 
The much-heralded transition to a "new economy" in the United States entails two shifts that are 
consequential for theory about social structure. The first shift is the decline of the mass 
production paradigm and the organizational forms and social structures associated with it. Even 
among the largest manufacturers, stable "organizations" have been replaced by fluid "networks" 
as forms of governance. The second shift is the dominance of capital markets as the primary 
mechanism of corporate finance in the U.S. and, increasingly, other industrialized economies. 
Businesses raise hnds not through personal ties to bankers but through arms-length market 
transactions; their owners, in turn, are not wealthy individuals but financial institutions. Theories 
of corporation and class suited to a "monopoly capitalist" economy prove increasingly 
inapplicable, and approaches to the firm in law and economics are of little help. Social 
movement theory provides an alternative set of constructs and mechanisms better suited to the 
contemporary economy. 
Introduction 
There is widespread agreement among social scientists that the United States is 
witnessing the emergence of a new economy borne through a "third industrial revolution." 
Aspects of this have been described in terms of a breakdown of the mass-production paradigm, 
the dissolution of traditional labor market institutions, and the emergence of globally expansive 
and hyper-vigilant capital markets led by institutional investors. High velocity labor markets 
coupled with protean production structures create a sense of ongoing flux in the arrangements 
disciplining economic life. The American system of corporate governance in which these other 
institutions are embedded has come to be a model for the world, at least in the eyes of some 
commentators (Useem, 1998). There is also general recognition that the transition to a new 
economy is accompanied by enormous social dislocation, and policy recommendations range 
from meliorative (e.g., Reich, 1991) to Malthusian (e.g., Jensen, 1993). The stakes are high, as 
evidenced by events following the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. 
How these changes are implemented-how the new economy comes to have a particular 
institutional structure-is by rights a central topic on the agenda of economic sociologists, and 
particularly for theorists of organization. But the broad contours of the new economy undermine 
efforts to theorize the world in terms of social entities such as "organizations." Organization 
theory imagines society as an urn filled with balls called organizations: a "high modernist" 
conception of boundary-maintaining bodies with relatively centralized control (cf. Scott, 1998). 
Yet economic production increasingly implicates shifting networks of actors and identities that 
appears more to resemble a vat of polymer goo, in Harrison White's (1992: 4) memorable 
terminology. In this paper, we argue that the core problem facing organizational theory is that it 
uses a vocabulary and ontology rooted in an image of a mass production, managerialist economy 
that was roughly apt for the 30 years following World War I1 in the U.S. but has become 
inapplicable to the current institutional structure of the economy. Based on a series of recent 
empirical studies, we critique extant theory for its weaknesses in providing usefbl insights into 
the changing economy. Finally, we outline how contemporary theory about social movements 
can inform organizational research on the contemporary organization of the economy. . 
What is new about "the new economyJJ? 
Proclamations of epochal shifts deserve skepticism. But there is substantial agreement 
among social scientists of various stripes'that the "post-industrial" economy in the U.S. is 
something different from its predecessor, and that this is realized in different ways of organizing 
production and different ways of organizing ownership. We first discuss these elements for the 
post-War U.S. economy and then describe recent changes. 
The transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism has been amply documented, 
accomplished over the course of the twentieth century through mergers that consolidated 
oligopolistic producers with national scope and tall managerial hierarchies. In broad strokes, the 
post-War U. S. economy was populated by large, vertically integrated mass producers. 
Employment and economic power were disproportionately concentrated in a few hundred major 
corporations. By the early 1980s, 55.3% of nongovernmental employees worked for the 750 
largest U.S. firms, and the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations accounted for 35% of the assets 
of all nonfinancial corporations (Davis, 1994). Large corporations such as these were said to 
reflect a separation of ownership and control-that is, they were owned by thousands of 
dispersed and disorganized investors, but controlled by professional managers who attained their 
positions through bureaucratic processes and owned little of the firm themselves. This situation 
of "managerialism" was argued to change the nature of class relations, from a Marxian society- 
wide conflict of workers vs. owners to a Weberian conflict of workers vs. managers within the 
enterprise (see Dahrendorf, 1959). Moreover, unshackling professional managers from the 
demands of organized investors was believed to free them from the strict dictates of profit 
maximization, enabling a "soulfbl corporation" that balanced the interests of various 
"stakeholders."' The aptness of this description was challenged (Zeitlin, 1974), but empirical 
ownership patterns supported it, as few large firms had a single family owning as much as 10% 
of their stock. 
In a society where employment and economic resources are concentrated within a 
relatively small number of large corporations, making sense of the corporate sector is a central- 
perhaps the paramount-task for social theory. Chick Perrow writes: 
[Tlhe appearance of large organizations in the United States makes organizations 
the key phenomenon of our time, and thus politics, social class, economics, 
technology, religion, the family, and even social psychology take on the character 
of dependent variables. .. .organizations are the key to society because large 
organizations have absorbed society. They have vacuumed up a good part of what 
we have always thought of as society, and made organizations, once a part of 
society, into a surrogate of society (Perrow, 1991: 725-726). 
By this account, to explain the structure of society entails explaining the configuration of 
organizations we have, as the U.S. has become a society of organizations. This synoptic view of 
social structure made organization theory (the branch of sociology concerned with formal 
organizations) the queen of the social sciences. The attainments of individuals are shaped by the 
reward structures and career ladders (Baron, 1984) and birth and death rates (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989) of the organizations in which they work; thus, stratification should be a sub-field 
' As Dahrendorf wrote in 1958: "Never has the imputation of a profit motive been further from the real 
motives of men than it is for modem bureaumitic managers." 
of organizational sociology. Creating formal organizations becomes the cover charge for 
participation in politics (Laumann and Knoke, 1987), and those running large organizations 
become distinctively influential over state policy, particularly when acting in concert with their 
colleagues (Useem, 1984); thus, political sociology (for the US) can also be subsumed. In 7he 
Sociological Imagination, C. Wright Mills cast the role of social science as making sense of the 
intersection of biography and history in social structure. In a society of organizations, 
organization theory holds the master key to social structure. 
But the corporate structures associated with the post-War U.S. economy have been 
substantially transformed in the past two decades, and with them the prospects for theories of 
social structure. For the sake of brevity, we emphasize two broad trends. The first is a shift in 
the social structures of production away from bounded organizations and toward unbounded 
network forms (what Sabel [1991] calls "Moebius-strip organizations"). The second is the 
hyper-development of capital markets and the marginalization of financial intermediaries such as 
commercial banks. 
Early inklings about the changing shape of production structures came from the 
surprising resurgence of industrial districts in Italy and elsewhere, which--coupled with the 
superior performance of vertically dis-integrated manufacturers in autos compared to Arnerican- 
style firms-came to be characterized as the breakdown of the mass production paradigm (Piore 
and Sabel, 1984). Organizations oriented to long production runs that made sense in a world of 
mass markets were disadvantaged when markets were segmented and tastes changed rapidly. 
Housing all or most steps of production within a single organizational boundary was not an end- 
state of industrial development. Alternative ways to divide labor among specialist firms, 
households, and individuals came to prominence. 
As Sabel and Zeitlin (1996) put it, "It is as though the prehistoric and imaginary creatures 
in the industrial bestiary had suddenly come to life," coexisting as a strange pastiche of economic 
forms. Some (e.g., industrial districts; home working; project work, as in construction or film 
production; short-run production networks linking small specialist firms, as in the garment 
industry) had existed for some time or were newly revived. Others were decidedly new. Nike 
represents one approach: the firm designs and markets sneakers from a base in Oregon but 
contracts out for virtually all production with East Asian manufacturers. Ingram Micro uses the 
same production line to assemble computers for archrivals Compaq, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, 
Apple, and Acer, which it also distributes. A vice president at Hewlett-Packard explained "We 
own all of the intellectual property; we farm out all of the direct labor. We don't need to screw 
the motherboard into the metal box and attach the ribbon cable" for the computer to be a Hewlett 
Packard product. And Volkswagen's facility in Resende, Brazil represents perhaps a first: an 
assembly plant run almost entirely by multinational subcontractors, referred to as a "modular 
consortium." Units of Rockwell and Cummins from the U.S., Eisenmann from Germany, and 
Delga from Brazil each have shops along the assembly line, along with suppliers headquartered 
in Japan and elsewhere; Volkswagen employees perform R&D, marketing, and quality control. 
The large majority of workers on site work not for VW but for the other multinational 
participants. Assembly workers are paid one-third what autoworkers in Sao Paulo make; union 
leaders are reportedly perplexed by the web of employers at Resende. (The perplexity around 
the relevant bargaining unit was almost certainly part of VW's plan.) Shortly after the Resende 
plant opened, GM announced plans for a similar mini-car factory in Brazil, to house 20 
multinational suppliers in what is seen as a prototype for future manufacturing facilities for 
appliances, VCRs, and other consumer goods. 
If these were mere anomalies, they would hold little interest. But there is systematic 
evidence of a global proliferation of various network forms, described by Bennett Hamson as 
"the signal economic experience of our era" (1994: 127). Due in large part to advances in 
information technology, the basic calculus of the make-or-buy decision has been altered for tasks 
from payroll to manufacturing to product design, and even down to naming the organization. In 
effect, almost everything that a firm might do has a ready market comparison in the form of a 
specialist contractor. The result is that it is difficult to identi@ what is "core" to an organization, 
and thus what needs protection from uncertainty (cf. Thompson, 1967). We have instead global 
production chains (McMichael, 1996) in which the boundaries around individual firms are 
provisional and highly permeable. Even basic facts about an organization's identity, such as 
whether it is a manufacturing or service business, are labile. Sara Lee Corporation, a large and 
diversified producer of food and clothing, announced plans in September 1997 to effectively 
abandon being a manufacturer in favor of being a marketer of its various brands, which range 
from Ball Park Franks to Hanes underwear to Coach leather goods. Its CEO, with the prodding 
of Wall Street analysts, came to realize that the firm's "core competence" was not in making 
things but'in managing their promotion and distribution, and thus the firm planned to shed most 
. . 
of its production capacity ("de-verticalize"). The increasing ambiguity around terms like 
"manufacturing" and "service" was reflected in 1995, when Fortune Magazine changed the 
definition of the Fortune 500 list from the 500 largest manufacturers to the 500 largest businesses 
overall. 
Changes in the social organization of production have profound implications for theory 
about organizations, understood as boundary-maintaining systems. Network production systems 
no longer map onto discrete, bounded entities such as organizations, and social structures of 
production increasingly elude description using the traditional theoretical vocabulary of 
organizational sociology. But another change is perhaps even more consequential for the nature 
of social structure. It is the enormous global expansion of capital markets and the changing 
nature of the intermediaries that operate in them. The renowned "triumph of markets" is in 
important ways the triumph of capital markets, both as a mechanism to finance (and discipline) 
corporations and as an outlet for the savings of households. In the United States during the 
1990s, the number of public corporations doubled (to over 1 1,000), the number of mutual funds 
tripled (to roughly 9,000), and the proportion of households reporting stock ownership reached a 
historic high of 42% (double the figure of 30 years earlier). With the encouragement of a well- 
developed venture capital industry, organizations are increasingly founded with an expectation 
that they will eventually go public, by floating shares on a stock exchange (Black and Gilson, 
1997). What has happened, in short, is that financial markets have largely supplanted alternative 
mechanisms (such as private ownership and bank lending) for channeling savings from 
households to firms in the U.S. (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999). 
The shift from embedded- ties to market-based transactions changes.the basic nature of 
corporate decision making. By hypothesis, markets assign prices to financial instruments (stocks 
and bonds) according to the expected future income associated with their ownership, adjusted for 
risk. Thus, managers of firms that care about share price will seek to demonstrate their fitness to 
the capital markets by cleaving to the standards of the most substantial market participants 
(Useem, 1996; cf. Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Demonstrating fitness to a dispersed financial 
market is rather different from managing inderdependencies with exchange partners, as it 
requires discerning and acting on intersubjectively-held mental models of appropriate practice 
that are "out there" in the market (Shiller, 1990). Indicators of fitness range from appointing 
CEOs of well-regarded firms to the board of directors (Davis and Robbins, 1998) to adopting 
particular kinds of incentive compensation systems and rationalizing them in appropriate ways 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1998) to streamlining the mix of industries in which the firm operates 
(Zuckerman, 1999). The most substantial market participants also prize liquidity, that is, the 
ability to sell a financial asset at any moment on a market for a known prevailing price. The 
marketability of a security is aided by the transparency of what it represents, which helps reduce 
intersubjective uncertainty about its value. Markets favor the overt over the tacit, and accounting 
rules and corporate strategies are designed to increase this transparency (Useem, 1996). 
Who owns the U.S. corporation has changed substantially in the last decades of the 2 0 ~  
century, thus altering the audience for corporate decisions from individual owners to institutions. 
Financial assets in the U.S. are owned primarily by financial institutions rather than households. 
Upwards of 60% of the shares of the largest 1000 corporations is owned by institutions (pension 
funds, mutual finds, banks, insurance companies, and others), and this proportion has been 
increasing over time. Individuals are the ultimate beneficiaries of this ownership, of course, but 
decisions about what financial assets to buy and sell are made by professionals trained.inq 
financial analytic techniques and rewarded based on tangible measures of the performance of the 
assets under their management2. In other words, the process by which capital is allocated and 
accumulated in the U.S. is largely in the hands of employees of institutions, not wealthy 
2 Tlus leads to some interesting peculiarities, particularly when pension funds are involved. Hostile 
takeovers were regarded as a direct cause of many plant closings and layoffs that decimated conimunities in the 
1980s. Those who ran large corporations adopted several innovations (such as the "poison pill") meant to make 
unwanted takeovers more difftcult, often cloaking their actions in a rhetoric of concern for labor and other 
"stakeholders." Remarkably, the most vociferous critics of these protective measures were pension funds such as 
the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), which sought to have companies rescind their poison pills as an 
unacceprable violation of the funds' property rights. The T e d e r s  pension fund has been most active on tlus issue 
recently, charging that managers seeking to protect their firms are thereby violating the Teamsters' rights as 
investors. 
individuals acting on their own behalf. The last vestige of the human touch in corporate 
finance-loans made by commercial banks, which must be approved by individuals who are 
willing to put a price on a loan based on their judgment-has been all but abandoned by large 
corporations, which can raise money more cheaply through money markets (Davis and Mizruchi, 
1999). The implication, again, is that corporate decision making is oriented toward market-based 
evaluations. 
In markets, disparate producers are compelled to make themselves comparable and 
thereby susceptible to ranking and valuation by buyers (White, 1992). The range of instruments 
traded on financial markets, and thus the set of competitors for favorable evaluation, has 
expanded dramatically during the past two decades through the practice of "securitization" (that 
is, turning income-producing entities into tradeable securities such as bonds). Since Fannie Mae 
entered the mortgage-backed securities business in 198 1, for instance, this market has expanded 
from $25 billion to over $4 trillion outstanding. In principle, almost anything that has future 
income associated with it can be securitized: a financial institution could bundle together a set of 
home mortgages, student loans, credit card receivables; or other loans it has made, divide them 
into shares, and sell them. The price of a share would reflect various factors likely to change the 
flow of income (e.g., changes in interest rates that influence whether individuals pay off 
mortgages early or default). Cheap computing power and new financial analytic techniques 
make it possible to place a value on such securities quickly in ways that would have been 
prohibitively expensive 25 years ago. Variations on this basic theme have become extravagant. 
In 1997, pop star David Bowie received $55 million for selling 10-year bonds to be paid from the 
anticipated royalties generated through future album sales. The entire issue was purchased by 
Prudential Insurance, and a unit of Nomura Securities subsequently established a division to 
specialize in creating securities backed by hture revenues generated by music, publishing, film, 
and television products. Insurance companies sell "disaster bonds" that pay attractive returns to 
their investors unless rare natural disasters (hurricanes; earthquakes) require the insurers to make 
large payouts to those they insure, in which case bondholders lose some or all of their 
investment. The large fees associated with underwriting these securities propel frantic 
innovation on the part of investment banks seeking to securitize anything with a potential income 
(or loss) associated with it. Again, these securities are generally purchased by institutions, not 
individuals. Institutions, moreover, have no inherent reason to prefer owning shares in a 
corporation to owning David Bowie bonds or bundles of Citibank credit card.receivables sold as 
securities: what they own is a financial asset for which the only relevant evaluations concern risk 
and return. As the range of entities traded as securities expands from home mortgages to 
insurance claims of the terminally ill to municipal settlements with tobacco companies, 
corporations (understood as financial entities) face increasingly exacting standards of evaluation 
by financial markets. 
How American corporations organize production and how they are financed have 
undergone a substantial transition toward decentralization. Social structures of production do not 
readily map onto the boundaries of formal organizations, and corporations operate in a world of 
disembedded, universalistic financial markets that discipline how they look and what they do. 
Further, the financial intermediaries that dominate these markets have little reason to prefer 
investing in the securities of American corporations to investing in other flavors of securities. To 
paraphrase Perrow (1991), financial markets are the key to society because financial markets 
have absorbed society. It is organizational strategies and structures that have become the 
dependent variables. 
Prospects and problems for theories of organization in the new economy 
Organization theory is the branch of sociology concerned with formal organizations, 
typically construed as entities constructed to pursue specific goals. The classic text defines 
organizations as "assemblages of interacting human beings [that are] the largest assemblages in 
our society that have anything resembling a central coordinative system.. . [This] marks off the 
individual organization as a sociological unit comparable in significance to the individual 
organism in biology" (March and Simon, 1958: 4). In this approach, "it is durable, coherent 
entities that constitute the legitimate starting points of.. . sociological inquiry" (Emirbayer, 1997: 
285). If organizations are taken as basic units of analysis analogous to actors or organisms, the 
domain of the discipline follows readily. Organization theory studies the origin, structure, 
persistence, change, and disappearance of organizations, as well as the relations constructed 
among them and the impacts they have on individuals and the broader society. The basic 
imagery is of organizations as meaninghlly bounded units responding to various pressures 
prompting adaptation or, failing that, selection. 
The difficulty of applying this approach to the new economy will be evident from the 
previous discussion. What might have made perfect sense in discussions of vertically integrated 
managerialist firms in the 1960s has come to be nearly irrelevant to the current structure of the 
corporate sector, as several studies document. We illustrate this with two theories that are 
considered to be among the crown jewels of the field: resource dependence theory and 
population ecology. In each case, two problems arise: they can't account for empirical patterns 
in the nature of American corporations since 1980, and they show little prospect of being able to 
do so into the future. 
Resource dependence theory. Resource dependence theory (RDT) builds a general framework 
for organizations from the base of a very parsimonious theory of exchange and power (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Burt, 1983; see Davis and Powell, 1992 for a review of the empirical 
research). Emerson's well-known approach sees actor A's power over actor B flowing from A's 
control over resources valued by B. To the extent that B values what A has and can't get it 
elsewhere, A has power over B and B is dependent on A. The greater B's dependence, the 
greater its vulnerability to A's whims and the greater the incentive to take steps to reduce the 
dependence by changing its structural position. RDT applies this approach to making sense of 
organizations as actors that seek autonomy and avoid uncertainty but are embedded in webs of 
exchange that create power and dependence relations. The prototype is a firm that relies on a 
supplier of a specialized input that it can't easily get elsewhere (such as the relation of General 
Motors to Fisher Body before GM acquired it). The supplier can hold up the buyer by seeking to 
change the terms of the contract during a crunch period when the buyer is vulnerable. 
Organizations can respond to this condition either by maintaining alternatives (using more than 
one supplier of the specialized input), co-opting the supplier (e.g., by placing one of the 
supplier's executives on the board of directors to cultivate empathy, which GM did with Fisher), 
or buying the supplier (which GM also eventually did with Fisher). If none of these are possible 
or sufficient to reduce vulnerability, perhaps because of unavoidable conditions in the industry, 
organizations seeking to evade dependence will diversify, operating across a number of 
industries. Diversification across industries reduces the dependence and uncertainty associated 
with operating in any one. 
Organizations thus deploy a repertoire of actions to respond to dependence that form in 
essence a Guttman scale: the greater the dependence, the more intense the response (from 
evasion to interlocking to outright merger). Evidence at the industry level appeared to support 
this account: the greater the uncertainty one industry posed for another, the more likely industry 
participants were to share directors, and the more likely were mergers between firms in the two 
industries (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Firm-level analyses purported to show similar effects 
(Burt, 1983). The problem is that from about 1980 onwards, this approach fails to account for 
virtually anything that large corporations did. Essentially, there was little variance left to 
explain. First, mergers and acquisitions by large firms did not map onto "problematic 
dependencies." Between 1986 and 1990, the 500 largest manufacturers in the U.S. (the "Fortune 
500) collectively make roughly 450 acquisitions. Among these firms, only about 5% bought a 
firm in an industry with significant vertical relations (that is, a potentially substantial buyer or 
supplier). In other words, vertical integration had largely disappeared in favor of alternatives 
like contracting out, at least in the manufacturing sector. Unrelated diversification has also all 
but disappeared as a tactic: only 3% of these firms did more than one unrelated acquisition 
during the late 1980s, and diversifiers tended not to be the most dependent organizations, but the 
least dependent, like GE and AT&T (Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley, 1994). Conversely, about 
113 of these firms sold off some businesses, usually shedding units outside their primary 
industries in order to focus on a "core competence" (Galvin, 1994). In other words, very few 
large corporations engaged in acquisitions to manage their exchange-based dependence. 
The same holds true for board interlocks (that is, cases where an executive of one firm 
serves on the board of directors of another firm). At one point, interlocks were feared as a device 
for collusion, with competing firms sharing directors in order to maintain a cartel. But since the 
Clayton Act of 1914 prohibiting such ties, few have appeared, and in 1994 there were no 
observed cases of competing major manufacturers appointing the same individual to their board. 
There were also few potentially co-optive interlocks: no more than 5% of large industrial firms 
had an executive of a firm in a major buyer or supplier industry on the board in 1994 (Davis, 
1996). Ties to financial institutions followed the same pattern: among the Fortune 1000 firms in 
1999 that were not commercial banks, only about one out of twenty had an interlock created via 
an executive of a major bank. Moreover, while 25% of firms had an executive serving on a 
major bank board in 1982, this number had dropped to 16% in 1994 and to under 11% in 1999, 
as money markets had replaced banks as sources of short-term debt for major corporations 
(Davis and Mizruchi, 1999). 
It is possible that global markets enabled by information technology have reduced the 
general level of dependence of any one business on any other, thus mooting the need for the 
repertoire described by RDT. But it is not the case that organizations don't merge or interlock; it 
is that they do not do so in the way described by resource dependence theory or for the reasons it 
hypothesizes. The top executives of major corporations make sense of their actions almost 
entirely in terms of "creating shareholder value," and actions that contradict the prevailing 
theories of how to create shareholder value (such as vertically integrating, or operating in several 
industries rather than focusing on one) are sanctioned. . Strategies.once construed as serving the 
organization's interest in stability are now seen as serving only the interests of the executives 
who run it. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 114) described their organizational rationale for 
acquisitions: "We will present data which suggest that merger is undertaken to accomplish a 
restructuring of the organization's interdependence and to achieve stability in the organization's 
environment, rather than for reasons of profitability or efficiency as has sometimes been 
suggested." Compare 7he Economist's account for the conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s: 
"Synergies from diversification did not exist .... This was a colossal mistake, made by the 
managers, for the managers" (The Economist, 1991: 44). What RDT describes as an empirical 
regularity driven by the organization's drive to reduce uncertainty is subsequently recognized as 
a pathology driven by pdorly-aligned managerial incentive structures. 
Notions of power and exchange are certainly still useful, but they get played out in a 
historical context that conditions how applicable they are. RDT's greatest strength-its 
topicality-is also its greatest weakness, because the phenomena it meant to explain are by and 
large absent today. One might argue that an empirical critique focusing on the Fortune 500 is 
simply sampling an unrepresentative tail of the distribution. But the largest firms historically 
accounted for such a disproportionate amount of the assets and employment of the 
manufacturing sector that it matters little whether the findings generalize to the remaining 
smaller firms. One might also argue that the problematic dependency that firms seek to manage 
now comes not from buyers and suppliers but from shareholders. Thus, corporate action is now 
oriented toward pleasing shareholders. But to the extent that the main motivation of 
organizational action becomes equivalent to making profits for shareholders, rather than 
organizational stability and survival, then the need for a theory that is not simply the economic 
theory of the firm is not obvious. 
Population Ecology. Much of the weakness of resource dependence theory comes from the fact 
that it focused on topical actions that were prevalent at the time the approach was being 
constructed but that subsequently disappeared. Problems with being overly topical are far less of 
a concern for population ecology, which seeks a general and trans-historical theory of 
organizations ranging from Finnish newspapers to American labor unions to German breweries 
to European universities. Ecology follows Perrow's "society of organizations" thinking to its 
logical conclusion: if organizations are the basic units of society, then we should be able to 
explain the structure of society. by explaining the demography of organizational forms, much as 
one would explain the composition of an urn full of balls by counting the number of balls of each 
size and color that came into or out of the urn. If we are in fact a society of organizations, what 
explains the proportions we have? Why are there only three U.S. automakers but dozens of 
hotels in Manhattan? The answer turns on the relative birth and death rates of organizations 
having these forms-presumably, over time selection processes insure that we end up with the 
number and proportions of organizations we have now (see Hannan and Freeman, 1989 for a 
comprehensive account). A crucial assumption of this approach is that organizations don't 
change in important ways over time: if balls changed colors and sizes after they were dropped 
into the urn, then counting which ones went in and came out couldn't tell us the composition of 
the urn. Thus, ecological research focuses primarily on birth and death rates of organizations 
sharing a form (where "form" is generally defined by industry rather than detailed information 
about organizational structure). 
Early studies documented that there were liabilities of newness (younger organizations 
are more likely to. fail than older ones) and smallness (small. firms fail .more often than big ones; 
see Davis and Powell, 1992 for a review). Subsequent research has explored a pair of empirical, 
regularities called "density dependence." The basic finding is that across a wide spectrum of 
c'populations," there is a curvilinear relation between the number of organizations in existence at 
any given time and the rates of birth and death of organizations of that type. That is, when there 
are few organizations in an industry (say, labor unions), the chances that any given one will fail 
are fairly high, but as more organizations enter the industry, the probability of failure for each of 
them goes down. M e r  a certain point, however, the effect reverses such that with each new 
entrant, the probability of failure goes up. Graphically, plotting probability of failure on number 
of organizations in the population yields a U-curve. The explanation is that there are two 
competing effects: legitimacy (the more organizations sharing a form there are, the greater their 
legitimacy), which dominates first, and competition (the more organizations there are, the less 
resources available for any one), which dominates later. The effects are reversed for births: 
greater density increases birth rates up to a point, after which it decreases them (see Hannan and 
Carroll, 1992 for a full elaboration). 
At first blush, it appears that density dependence conflates causes and consequences: the 
thing to be explained (the number of organizations of a given type) is explained by the number of 
organizations of a given type. Of course, when this quantity is on the right-hand side of the 
equation, it is an indicator (simultaneously) of the constructs of legitimacy and competition, 
whereas when it is (figuratively) on the left-hand side, it is the construct itself. But the deeper 
problem is an ontological one: across much of the manufacturing and service economy in the 
U.S., it simply no longer makes sense to count organizations as meaningfbl entities that are born 
and die in a fashion analogous to organisms. In a social world that looks less like an urn filled 
with balls than a vat of polymer goo, explanation through counting misses the major dynamics of 
the new economy. Locating boundaries around firms and even industries becomes an 
increasingly fruitless task. 
Biotech and the culture industries provide shopworn examples, but even the large 
bureaucratic organizations that motivated the initial ecological arguments about structural inertia 
(see Hannan and Freeman, 1984 on the inertial effects of age and size) prove to be protean when 
it pleases financial markets. The recent history of the entity formerly known as Westinghouse 
shows how: a century-old industrial conglomerate that dabbled in media and employed well over 
100,000 people, its CEO was forced out by investor pressure in 1993 and replaced with an 
executive from Pepsi. Within five years, the former Pepsi executive sold off dozens of 
businesses, bought CBS and other properties, and after initially proposing to split the company in 
two chose instead to liquidate its remaining industrial operations. On December 1, 1997, 
Westinghouse ceased to exist, and CBS became the new identity of the remaining corporation, 
which abandoned its traditional home in Pittsburgh for New York City. Its 1997 revenues and 
employment were less than half those of 1990, while its profits were more than doubled. 
One example that strains the biological metaphor of ecology may not be proof, but the 
systematic evidence points in the same direction. Between 1980 and 1990, 28% of the Fortune 
500 largest American manufacturers were subjected to takeover bids, which were usually 
"hostile" (that is, outsiders sought to buy the company against the wishes of its current 
management) and usually ended up in the sale of the company. A large proportion of these 
takeovers were motivated by the fact that diversified companies operating across several 
industries could be bought for far less than one could get for dismembering them and selling off 
the component parts, which was what usually happened following the sale (Davis et al., 1994). 
In light of this, those running large corporations began dismembering their own organizations, 
although not usually as dramatically as Westinghouse. Within a decade, one-third of the largest 
corporations ceased to exist as independent organizations (almost none through business failure), 
and those that remained operated in half as many industries on average as they had at the start 
(Davis et a]., 1994). The manufacturing economy of the US was driven to a radical restructuring 
by financial concerns, through processes bearing no relation to "birth and "death." This 
trajectory continued without letup through the first seven years of the 1990s and showed every 
sign of continuing into the fhture, as "creating shareholder value" had become the only 
acceptable rhetoric for those that run corporate America. The end state of manufacturing 
organization when capital markets are dominant appears to be hyper-specialization coupled with 
production through networks (Davis and Robbins, 1999). 
There are of course contexts where organizations do seem to be born and die, and the 
\ 
biological imagery still seems apt. When competitors are dividing a fixed pie of demands (e.g., 
geographically bounded areas with a stable base of consumers, such as day care centers or hotels 
in a metropolitan area), ecological models apply fairly well (e.g., Baum and Mezias, 1992). But 
finding those (increasingly rare) contexts where the model applies is like looking for one's lost 
keys under the streetlight. Organizations that are elements of small-firm production networks 
may have readily-defined birth and death dates (e.g., the buttonhole sewing specialists that sub- 
contract work in the New York garment industry), but their life chances are utterly bound up in 
the production networks of which they are a part (Uzzi, 1997). One could bump up the unit of 
analysis such that the network itself is the thing that is born and dies. But new networks are born 
and die with utterpredictability as the fashion "seasons" change. The Procrustean bed of 
ecological theorizing would thus obscure rather than clarify the dynamics of the industry. 
Summary. Organization theory traditionally treats corporations as meaninghlly bounded, 
actorly entities analogous to organisms. This was a reasonable imagery. for some purposes in 
analyzing the organization of the post-War American economy, but the metaphors of 
"sovereignty" and birth and death no longer make sense of the corporate sector. In contrast to 
the world described by Dahrendorf, there is no ambiguity on the part of contemporary corporate 
executives about the purposes of corporations: they exist exclusively to maximize shareholder 
value, which renders any attachment to industry, employees, and place outdated sentimentality, 
and any efforts at managing interdependence suspect. 
We do not argue that it was never appropriate to study organizations as units, and there is 
no denying the appeal of the biological analogy. If not the master key to explaining society 
envisioned by Perrow, organization theory was at least broadly descriptive of the American 
manufacturing economy for much of the post-War era. But even the barest description of the 
contours of the new economy eludes description using the traditional vocabulary of organization 
theory, as exemplified by resource dependence theory and population ecology Our objection is 
not a philosophical concern that sociologists "should study relations rather than things (cf. 
Emirbayer, 1997) or organizing rather than organizations (Weick, 1979); it is simply that the 
theories don't work on their own terms any more. 
Problems for con ven fional theories of class 
Although we cannot develop the theme at length here, it is worth noting that problems for 
theories that take organizations as basic units of analysis have analogues in theories of class. 
Critiques of marxian class categories appeared in fairly short order after the discovery of a 
"managerial revolution" separating ownership and control, and Ralf Dahrendorf stated the case 
most boldly. The post-war economy was dominated by vast mass production organizations 
owned by dispersed and powerless shareholders and controlled by professional managers who 
attained their positions through higher education and demonstrated merit. These high-level 
bureaucrats may clash with the production workers over the exercise of authority, and they may 
earn stratospheric salaries, but they do not constitute a capitalist class rooted in control of 
property. "A theory of class based on the division of society into owners and nonowners of 
means of production loses its' analytical value as soon as legal ownership and factual control are 
separated" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 136). The managerial revolution replaced the fixed boundaries of 
old classes rooted in property ownership with the mobility of a meritocracy; thus, "...the 
participants, issues, and patterns of conflict have changed, and the pleasing simplicity of Marx's 
view of society has become a nonsensical construction" (57). There were surely strata based on 
income, but there were no longer politically meaningfid classes whose interactions provided a 
trajectory to history. 
Not everyone was convinced. Even if one conceded the separation of ownership and 
control, a variety of devices compelled managers to act in the interests of owners (who were 
often well-hidden wealthy families-Zeitlin, 1974). More importantly, owners and managers 
were mutually socialized through elite institutions that allowed them to develop and act on 
common class interests. Research on these institutions sought to document how members of the 
"corporate elite" came to form a self-recognized class capable of exercising unique power over 
government policy. Various mechanisms were argued to make class cohesion more likely, 
including board interlocks, living in Greenwich, Connecticut, going to Bohemian Grove to 
network, or forming associations like the Business Roundtable (Useem, 1984). 
But the danger of lumping together owners and managers as a common interest group 
became evident during the 1980s. The advent of the hostile takeover highlighted the 
fundamentally conflicting interests of those who ran corporations and those who owned them: 
corporate executives typically ended up stigmatized and unemployed following a successfU1 
takeover, while shareholders commonly got 30-50% premiums for selling their shares to those 
doing the takeover. To defend their turf against errant owners, managers and boards adopted an 
array of devices to make it difficult to take their firms over, such as "poison pills," and "golden 
parachutes" to ensure that they were well-compensated if they lost their jobs af'ter a takeover 
(Davis and Greve, 1997). 
Owners protested vigorously the encroachment on their property rights and the potential 
losses fiom unconsummated takeovers. Notably, the most vocal owners were not wealthy 
families but pension hnds such as the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) and the 
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS). The ambiguity of the class 
interests at play in takeovers was highlighted by the rhetoric of the contending parties when 
managers and owners disagreed on issues of corporate control. When adopting poison pills or 
lobbying state legislatures for legal protection, corporate managers routinely cited the 
devastation wrought by hostile takeovers and their obligations to protect employees, 
communities, and other "stakeholders" in the corporation. Pension hnds were not swayed by 
such sentimentality and argued-with some success in the policy arena-that their property 
rights came first (Davis and Thompson, 1994). The period of owner irrelevance described by 
Dahrendorf had been replaced by owner hegemony. Yet the hegemons are largely pension fbnd 
administrators and other fbnd managers, not elites with inherited wealth. Because the 
performance of the hnds they manage is fairly objective, almost anyone in their positions would 
articulate the same interests. It takes no special enlightenment for them to recognize the interests 
associated with their role, or to construct devices for pursuing them. But most importantly, they 
can in no sense be identified with the corporate executives to whom their hnds are entrusted, nor 
can they be identified with the wealthy individuals who live off the fruits of their own 
investments. Their class location may be contradictory, but their influence on the course of 
business is substantial. 
Why the economic theory of the firm is not much help 
Economic activities are not meaninghlly bounded within corporations, and pressures 
from financial markets-both from institutional investors and more disembodied sources--drive 
the decisions of those who run corporations. Both shifts create problems of relevance for 
organization theory. 
There exists a theoretical approach with a surprising amount of surface relevance for 
approaching these problems. It is the agency theory or contractarian approach to the'corporation, 
which developed primarily within the school known as law and economics. The approach begins 
with the assertion that the "separation of ownership and control" described by Berle and Means 
(1932) cannot have the consequences they attributed to it, that is, managers with substantial 
discretion to run corporations in ways harmful to investors. Rational investors (principals) 
would shun corporations without safeguards against self-dealing managers, and thus such 
corporations would be selected out. Managers (agents) know thus and thus create organizational 
structures that demonstrate their corporations' fitness as an investment vehicle (Easterbrook and 
Fischel, 1991). Indeed, the structure of the corporation and the institutions in which it is 
embedded (corporate and securities law; financial markets; the "market" for takeovers) embody 
attempts to resolve the divergence of interests between shareholders and managers. Some 
practices are voluntary adaptations to demonstrate fitness (e.g., appointing a hard-headed former 
Secretary of State to the board of directors to be a credible watchdog), while others are devices 
evolved to institutionalize the resolution of conflicts (e.g., corporate law; the takeover market). 
But understanding institutional resolutions of the inherent conflict between owners and managers 
is the central agenda of the approach. 
The contractarian approach also has an ontological appeal, as it questions the 
meaningfulness of the boundaries of organizations rather than assuming firms to be bounded 
units. Initially, this was stated as a critique rooted in methodological individualism (that is, the 
view that theoretical explanations must ultimately be reducible to the,actions of individuals): 
... most organizations are simply legalfictions which serve as a nexus for a set of 
contracting relationships between individuals.. . . Viewed in this way, it makes 
little or no sense to try to distinguish those things which are 'inside' the firm (or 
any other organization) fiom those that are 'outside' of it. There is in a very real 
sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal 
fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the 
consumers of output .... We seldom fall into the trap of characterizing the wheat or 
stock market as an individual, but we often make this error by thinking about 
organizations as if they were persons with motivations and intentions. (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976: 3 10- 1 1, emphasis in original) 
This view of the organization as nothing but a set of contracting relations matches well with the 
types of network organizational structures we described previously. In the contemporary 
economy, "The question is not when is a nexus-of-contracts afirm, but when is it moreBrm-like" 
(Demsetz, 1991). Rather than "assuming an organization," this approach assumes a set of 
markets instead. 
Strong selection pressures from both product and capital markets insure that corporate 
structures are reasonably efficient, if not optimally so. Thus, the most prevalent institutional 
features of the corporate economy can be assumed to serve some discernible economic fbnction 
(Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991). The separation of ownership and control, long regarded as an 
unavoidable cost of large size, was re-interpreted as an efficient division of labor between those 
who were good at managing but had little capital and those who didn't know how to manage.but 
were good at owning. Moreover, the fact that the corporate equivalents of elections are run by 
management and the board and typically yield nearly-unanimous support for the policies of the 
incumbent board is not a problem but a virtue. The costs to shareholders of gathering the 
information to vote intelligently are not outweighed by the benefits, and thus "investors in public 
firms often are ignorant and passive" for good reason (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991: 11). If the 
prospective benefit of gathering more information outweighed the cost, someone would do it. 
Moreover, passive shareholders are protected by a phalanx of mechanisms that protect their 
investment without their active intervention. Managers compete among themselves to "add 
value," and are rewarded appropriately. This competition in the managerial labor market 
redounds to the benefit of shareholders (Fama, 1980). Managerial labor markets are 
complemented by director labor markets, where those most vigilant and talented at finding 
worthy managers to promote are rewarded (Fama and Jensen, 1983). If all else fails, poorly run 
firms will be punished with low share prices, inviting takeover by more talented managers (a 
process known as the "market for corporate control"; Manne, 1965). The end result is that we 
dwell in the best of all possible worlds, where only fit firms survive a Darwinian competition for 
capital (see Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991: Chapter 1 for a compact summary). 
Recognizing that considerations of corporate finance (how corporations get the money to 
fund what they do) provide the motor of institutional development is a usehl.first step in making 
sense of the governance of American corporations. But it is crucial to recognize that politics and 
social structures hold the steering wheel. An extensive critique has appeared elsewhere (Davis 
and'Thompson, 1994), but we want to highlight the centrality of "contentious politics" 
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 1996) to the evolution of the corporation. Even the most basic 
structural feature of the American corporation-the separation,of ownership and:control-is best, 
explained by political struggles that resulted in the fragmentation of financial intermediaries. In 
contrast to banks in other industrialized nations, American banks have been relatively small, 
weak, and prohibited fiom intervening in the affairs of corporations. Allowing banks to expand 
nationally (rather than only within states) and to own shares in corporations would most likely 
have created institutions with the wherewithal to hold influential stakes in even the largest 
corporations. But small town bankers (who didn't want the competition), populists (who didn't 
trust concentrated economic power), and professional managers (who appreciated the autonomy 
afforded by dispersed shareholders) repeatedly induced legislators to prevent such developments 
(Roe, 1994). 
Political events of the late 1980s caused even the most devoted contractarians to re- 
evaluate their faith in the eficacy of American corporate governance and in the causal primacy 
of markets in shaping corporate structures (see Jensen, 1993). The agency approach requires a 
selection mechanism to ensure that the strong survive and the weak perish, and the favored 
institution is the so-called market for corporate control. By hypothesis, firms that don't live up 
to their promise suffer low share prices, giving incentives to more talented managers to buy and 
rehabilitate these undervalued assets. The existence of predators (corporate raiders) is argued to 
keep the prey on their toes, while the consequences of allowing firms to avoid deserved 
takeovers (e.g., by enabling boards to adopt poison pills) are dire. Thus, "Protected by 
impenetrable takeover defenses, managers and boards are likely to behave in ways detrimental to 
shareholders ... The end result, if the process continues unchecked, is likely to be the destruction 
of the corporation as we know it" (Jensen, 1988: 347). It would be as if gazelles learned how to 
erect electric fences to keep out the lions. Yet this electric fence scenario happened on a vast 
scale, as more than 40 states passed laws making.it difficult to take over local corporations-in 
virtually every instance, at the behest of groups of the managers of Iocal corporations, typically 
making common cause with labor organizations through an impromptu social movement (Davis 
and Thompson, 1994). 
The most contentious case, and also most informative, was the Pennsylvania statute of 
1990. In late 1989 the Belzberg brothers, notorious corporate raiders fiom Canada, threatened 
Armstrong World Industries with a takeover. Pennsylvania had been hard-hit by takeovers in the 
1980s, most notably when Chevron acquired Gulf in 1984, closing Gulfs Pittsburgh 
headquarters and eliminating thousands ofjobs. Thus, there was considerable sympathy when 
Armstrong's management sought restrictive anti-takeover legislation that would have made it 
essentially impossible to take over a Pennsylvania firm without seeking its board's approval. As 
happened in other states, Armstrong was joined by the Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry as well as by labor representatives and local public officials in supporting the bill. 
Faced with such support, the bill sailed through the state Senate with little debate and a final vote 
of 45-4. However, hearings in the state House mobilized substantial opposition fiom investors, 
academic lawyers and economists, newspaper editorialists, and the Chairman of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. Wall Street Journal editorialists accused the state of 
"expropriation;" the New York Tinles stated the law "intimadates legitimate challengers by 
penalizing them if their buyout offers fail;" and a local attorney stated "The law undermines and 
erodes free markets and property rights. From this perspective, this is an anticapitalist law." 
~ e c o ~ n i z i n ~  that they were sure to lose a clash perceived as "communities vs. markets," 
the Belzbergs hired The Analysis Group, a consulting organization with academic affiliates, to 
research and explain the potential impact of the law using economic science. Legislators 
received a letter denouncing the billsigned by a group of law andeconomics scholars organized 
by an Analysis Group affiliate. The Belzbergs successfblly ran Michael Jensen (a noted agency 
theorist at Harvard Business School and Analysis Group affiliate) as a dissident for the 
Armstrong board. But the most interesting opposition to the law came from institutional 
investors. Officials of the two major Pennsylvania public pension finds strongly opposed the 
bill, with the chairman of the Public School Employees' Retirement System labeling it a 
"disaster" that would "lower the stock values of Pennsylvania corporations," and other pension 
hnds voicing similar concerns. And in what was perhaps a first, institutional investors 
threatened a "capital strikeH-that is, to systematically divest ownership in Pennsylvania 
, corporations if the law were to pass. 
Legislators, however, were more swayed by local business and labor leaders than by 
nonlocal academics and investors, and the bill passed the House 18 1 - 1 1. Researchers attributed 
a roughly $4 billion loss in the stock market value of Pennsylvania corporations to the bill. And 
in part as a result of such laws, the prevalence of hostile takeovers declined substantially during 
the 1990s: whereas there were 83 takeover bids for Fortune 500 firms from 1981-1986 (most 
hostile), there were 17 fiom 1991-1996, and only five could be considered hostile (Davis and 
Robbins, 1999). In short, the gazelles had erected their fence. 
The implications of organized contention among management, labor, and capital are 
many. For the contractarian approach, it is evident that selection regimes are themselves 
political choices, and that those running corporations can be well-organized and effective in 
influencing these choices. We can't understand why we have the corporations we do without 
unpacking the politics. But politics is embedded in social structures that shape whether, when, 
and how collective action occurs, and how effective it is (Tilly, 1978). It is here that the 
relevance of social movement theory becomes apparent for the study of the new economy. 
Using social movement theory to understand the new economy 
We have argued that changes in the organization of production and the expanding scale 
and scope of financial markets create fbndamental problems for organization theory as it applies 
to the contemporary American economy. Approaches such as resource dependence theory and 
population ecology take organizations to be basic units of analysis. As units, organizations are 
born, they manage interdependence with other organizations, and eventually they die. Their 
inner workings and vital rates structure the careers and life chances of their members. Building 
on this notion, Perrow (1991) envisions a "society of organizations" in which economy and 
society consist of (large) organizations. Of course, organization theorists have recognized that 
treating organizations as bounded units was a form of reification, as organizations rarely 
encompass their members hlly (see Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 29-32). Such reification was 
simply a justifiable cost of doing business as an organization theorist. But we have argued that 
the imagery of organizations-as-units has finally become more misleading than enlightening, 
leading one to ask the wrong kinds of questions and use,the wrong kinds of mechanisms to make 
sense of the social structure of the economy. The contractarian approach to the corporation, 
widely embraced in law and economics, has some appeal but misses essential processes of social 
change. This is particularly the case when one considers times of economic upheaval, when 
institutional structures themselves .(such as "selection regimes") are in flux. 
The challenge, then, is to find an appropriate theoretical vocabulary to describe and 
explain the types of economic structures that the new economy has brought us. Making sense of 
the constitution of new social structures during times of economic and social upheaval is familiar 
turf for students of social movements. Much of the work has been on the first two industrial 
revolutions, but there is no obvious reason why the so-called third industrial revolution currently 
underway cannot be understood using the same tools. The dynamics of episodic collective 
action, for instance, seem to us to be precisely parallel to those of episodic economic production. 
Participants are not "members" bound by inclusion and subject to the authority of a leader, but 
"citizens" who may be persuaded to act in concert voluntarily. Thus, the conceptual kit bag of 
social movement scholars (e.g., mobilizing structures, framing processes, perceived opportunities 
and threats, repertoires of contention) is equally relevant to an analysis of the emerging forms of 
economic action. Moreover, the assumptions characteristic of much social movement theory are 
consistent with the previous critique: boundaries around social units are problematized; interests 
and grievances are to some degree socially constructed rather than transparent; and the kinds of 
mobilizing structures are path dependent. And the questions that arise in understanding social 
movements are analogous to those concerning new forms of organization: how is collective 
action coordinated when participation by "members" is impromptu and impermanent; what are 
the characteristic routines of collective action likely to be shared by potential participants; and 
how do pre-existing social structures (such as networks) influence when and where collective 
action will occur. 
We see, in short, a strong analogy between the processes of mobilization for collective 
action in social movements and in contemporary business organizations. Mayer Zald and 
Michael Berger (1978) drew a similar parallel over 20 years ago in their pathbreaking analysis of 
social movements in organizations. Our focus is somewhat different: we see contemporary 
economic organizations as social movements, that is, forms of more-or-less episodic forms of 
more-or-less coordinated collective action. We argue that contemporary theory about social 
movements provides constructs and a vocabulary attuned. to the types of actions and actors that 
we have described: 
Actors, in, this view, are not neatly-bounded, self-propelling entities with fixed 
attributes, but concentrations of energy that interact incessantly with surrounding 
sources of energy, and undergo modifications of their boundaries and attributes as 
they interact. Actions consist not of self-deliberated emissions of energy but of 
interactions among sites. Identities do not inhere in fixed attributes of such sites, 
much less in states of consciousness at those sites, but in representations of 
interactions and of connections between those sites and the interactions in which 
they are involved. Contentious politics does not simply activate pre-existing 
actors and their fixed attributes, but engages a series of interactive performances 
that proceed through incessant improvisation within broadly-defined scripts and 
organizational constraints (Tilly, 1998: 3). 
Theories about organizations and social movements share a common agenda of making 
sense of more-or-less routinized collective action-its sources, structures, and outcomes. Thus, 
there has been some interchange among these two traditions (see Zald and Berger, 1978; 
Clemens, 1993; Minkoff, 1997; and particularly Koput, Powell, and Smith-Doem, 1997). To the 
extent that economic action comes to look like contentious politics, we expect that theory about 
social movements will be applicable to the traditional domain of organization theory. We make 
our case by comparing the emergence of a national movement to its analogue with industry 
emergence, and by examining parallels between the periodic mobilization of routine contention 
and project-based production. In both cases, we illustrate the applicability of social movement 
theory to contemporary economic structures. Both strike us as relevant to the search for causal 
analogies between social movements and formal economic organizations. 
The Origins of Social Movements 
A fairly strong consensus has emerged among scholars of social movements around the 
question of how social movements arise. Increasingly, one finds scholars emphasizing the 
importance of the same broad sets of factors in analyzing the origins of collective action. These 
three factors are: 1) an expansion in the political opportunities or threats confronting a given 
challenger; 2) the forms of organization (informal as well as formal) available to insurgents as 
sites for initial mobilization, and 3) the collective processes of interpretation, attributionand 
social construction that mediate between opportunitylthreat and action. We will refer to these 
three factors by their conventional shorthand designations: political opportunitieslthreats, 
mobilizing structures, and framing processes. 
Expanding Political Opportunities or Threats. Movement scholars have come to believe that 
under conditions of relative political stability, excluded groups, or challengers, rarely mobilize. 
Instead movements arise when broader change processes serve to either significantly threaten the 
interests of challengers or render the existing regime newly vulnerable or receptive to challenger 
demands. Expansions in political opportunity or threat accompany any broad change process 
that serves to significantly undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political 
status quo. Among the events and processes especially likely to destabilize the status quo are 
wars, rapid industrialization, international political realignments, economic crises of various 
sorts, and mass migrations or other disruptive demographic processes. 
Extant Mobilizing Structures. If destabilizing changes to the structure of institutionalized 
politics shapes the likelihood of collective action, the influence of such changes is not 
independent of the various kinds of mobilizing structures through which groups seek to organize 
and press their claims. The term mobilizing structures refers to those collective vehicles, 
informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action. 
These include groups, formal organizations, and informal networks that comprise the collective 
building blocks of social movements. The .shared assumption among movement scholars is that 
changes in the system of institutionalized politics only afford challengers the stimulus to engage 
in collective action. It is the organizational vehicles available to the group at the time the 
opportunity or threat presents itself that conditions its ability to respond to this environmental 
stimulus. In the absence of such vehicles, the challenger is apt to lack the capacity to act even 
when motivated to do so. 
Framing or other Interpretive Processes. If a combination of opportunitylthreat and 
mobilizing structures affords a potential challenger a certain structural potential for action, they 
remain, in the absence of one final factor, insufficient to account for emergent collective action. 
Mediating between opportunitylthreat and action are the shared meanings and cultural 
understandings that people bring to an episode of incipient contention. At a minimum people 
need to feel aggrieved andlor threatened by some aspect of their life and at least minimally 
optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem. Conditioning the presence or 
absence of these perceptions is that complex of social psychological dynamics-collective 
attribution, social construction-which David Snow and various of his colleagues (Snow et al., 
1986; Snow and Benford, 1988) have referred to as framingprocesses. When the cognitive and 
affective byproducts of these processes are combined with opportunitylthreat and sufficient 
organization, chances are very good that collective action will develop. 
Though there is consensus among movement scholars regarding the basic factors that 
condition the initial mobilization of a social movement, such a framework does not by itself 
constitute a dynamic model of movement origins. How these factors combine to trigger initial 
mobilization and by what intervening mechanisms is less clearly specified in contemporary 
movement theory. To redress this deficiency, the second author has recently proposed a 
modified version of this basic framework in which the "static list of factors" has been replaced 
by a set of contingent, dynamic relationships which are thought to predict the onset of "episodes 
of contention" (McAdam, 1998). This modified framework is sketched in Figure 2. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 depicts movement emergence as a highly contingent outcome of an ongoing 
process of interaction involving at least one set of state actors and one challenger. But while 
McAdam focuses on social movements at the state level, we think the perspective can be usehlly 
deployed to account for the rise of innovative strategic action among any social actors, including 
organizations. In our view, the framework can be readily adapted to analyzing emergent 
innovation within any relatively coherent system of institutionalized power (e.g. an industry, a 
single firm, etc.). In Figure 3 we have adapted the model to fit the case of innovative economic 
action within an industry. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Applying Social Movement Theory: Industry Emergence 
Figure 3 attributes innovative economic action-such as industry emergence-to a highly 
contingent process in which destabilizing changes (typically exogenous to the field in question) 
set in motion a sequence of linked mobilization dynamics. The remainder of this section is given 
over to a discussion of this general sequence. To make the discussion less abstract, we will use a 
single case-the emergence of the contemporary media industry-to illustrate the more general 
analytic claims being advanced. 
Referring to the media as an industry is something of an.act of reification, as some 
analysts count at least seven separate industries as constituents of the "communications" 
industry: television broadcasting, film studies, cable TV, telecommunications, computers, 
consumer electronics, and publishing (Auletta, 1998). The identities of the core players are 
remarkably labile, and their web of affiliations is dense and tangled. We mentioned 
Westinghouse's transformation from old-line industrial conglomerate to broadcaster. GE entered 
the broadcasting industry via its purchase of NBC, and Disney through its purchase of Capital 
CitiesIABC. Seagram, the venerable purveyor of alcoholic beverages, became a filmmaker and 
amusement park operator through its purchase of Universal, and expanded its presence in the 
music industry through its acquisition of Polygram. Sony expanded from consumer electronics 
to music and movies. Formerly clear distinctions between industries and media have collapsed 
as television shows spawn movies (and vice versa), newspapers publish on the World Wide Web, 
and characters created for movies are merchandised through toys, software, books, fast food, 
theatrical productions, and other forms of branded merchandise. (Disney's film "The Lion 
King," for instance, was merchandised through 186 different products and turned into a 
Broadway show.) 
What is occumng is the emergence of a global meta-industry out of the confluence of 
new communication and computing technologies, deregulation in the United States, and 
privatization elsewhere. The identities and dominance ordering of the core players in the sector 
are subject to dramatic variations as long-established participants from constituent industries are 
overshadowed by new challengers, often from previously adjacent industries. To take a 
shopworn example, the World Wide Web did not exist in 1990 yet has helped spawn a vast 
outpouring of new businesses and new mini-industries. The market capitalization of 
Amazon.com, an on-line bookstore that began operations in 1994, exceeded those of Barnes & 
Noble and Borders combined four years later. The list of new billion-dollar communications 
companies is long. Conversely, older players (such as the three broadcast networks) fall hrther 
behind as the new economic order takes shape. 
Currently there is an inherent and irreducible unpredictability that undermines the 
calculations of participants tenured under the old regime in the media industry. Figuring out 
what to do and how to structure oneself in order to succeed appear to hinge more on blind luck 
than high-level strategizing. Technological advances undermine traditional sources of monopoly 
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power and erode industry boundaries. Television programming can be delivered over phone 
lines; phone calls can be sent over the Internet; Internet connections can be achieved through 
television cables; "cable" programming can be delivered via satellite. Even such basic matters as 
morphology elude description: an initially helpful parsing of the communications industry into 
"channels" (or "distribution") and "content" (or "software") began to lose its analytical value as 
content providers (such as Disney) integrated into channels and channels (such as Microsoft) 
integrated into content. There is no settled model of what a "communications" corporation 
should look like due to the pervasive uncertainty around the industry, and thus the shifting 
portfolios of the major participants (chosen from among film studios, newspapers, amusement 
parks, satellite delivery systems, sports teams, broadcast networks, and so on) represent diverse 
models of appropriate corporate practice. 
Television broadcasting had perhaps the most stable dominance ordering among the 
constituent industries going into the 1980s. Three incumbents formed an .oligopoly capturing 
upwards of 90% of the total viewing audience, and challengers were peripheral. For these 
broadcasters, a fundamental exogenous change came with the spread of cable television, which 
offered alternative means of distribution for "content," and thus an opportunity for challengers. 
The rhetoric of challengers seeking to take advantage of this opening at times took on a populist 
tone: in appearing before Congress in 1976 to seek support for launching a national 
"superstation," Ted Turner said: 
You have to remember there are three supernetworks ... that are controlling the 
way this nation thinks and raking off exorbitant profits.. .They have an absolute, a 
virtual stranglehold, on what Americans see and think, and I think a lot of times 
they do not operate in the public good. I came into the independent television 
station business because I believe there should be more voices heard than the 
network voices out of New York.. . (quoted in Guthey, 1997: 191). 
The threat fiom cable initially roused little concern from the established broadcasters. 
The offerings seemed laughable: a 24-hour news channel with no-name anchors and bargain- 
basement production values; a station that showed promotional videos for rock bands around the 
clock; an outlet where hawkers sold merchandise via a toll-free number. Within a few years, of 
course, CNN, MTV, and QVC grew enormously, largely at the expense of the broadcast 
networks. By 1997, the parents of these three (Time Warner, Viacom, and TCI) each far 
outstripped the venerable CBS in revenue and influence. Thus, what challengers recognized as 
opportunities went unrecognized as threats by incumbents until well into the process. By June 
1998, more people tuned in to cable programming than the offerings of the four largest broadcast 
networks combined (CBS, NBC, ABC, and Fox). 
How was this upheaval accomplished? The empirical literature documenting the 
emergence of social movements suggests that movements most commonly arise through the 
appropriation of existing organizations for new purposes rather than through the founding of 
entirely new organizations. The most famous instance of this was the transformation of the black 
church in the South from a generally. conservative institution into a key mobilizing structure in 
the civil rights movement. This required a shift in the churches' missions, from an orientation to 
the afterlife to a focus on social justice. Similar processes occur in the media, as porous 
boundaries among communications industries allowed organizations in one industry to launch 
entries into other industries. Biographies some of the most successfbl communications 
companies demonstrate this organizational "appropriation." Rupert Murdoch parlayed a small 
Australian newspaper that he inherited fiom his father into the $1 1 billion News Corporation, 
which owns 2oth Century Fox, the Fox Network, numerous newspaper, magazine, and book 
publishers, several sports teams, satellite broadcasting systems covering much of the globe, and 
has interests in over 90 television channels. Ted Turner used his father's billboard business as a 
vehicle to buy a UHF station that begat the "superstation," CNN, and other successhl cable 
ventures (see Guthey, 1997 for a critical recounting of the Turner legend). Edgar Bronfman Jr. 
turned his family business-Seagram-from a purveyor of beverages to a media behemoth 
through acquisitions and divestitures. 
The result of the ongoing re-configuration of the largest media firms has been that 
organizational boundaries are resolutely tentative, essentially fictions. Where conglomerates 
have all but disappeared in American manufacturing, de-regulation in the US has allowed the 
construction of global media "conglomerates" stretching across conventional industry and 
geographic boundaries. Moreover, because each of the largest participants in the media industry 
maintain eclectic portfolios of "channels," "software," and "hardware," it is quite common to see 
corporations that are fierce competitors in one domain creating alliances in another. For 
example, the file Titarzic was co-produced by Fox and Viacom's Paramount and spawned a 
soundtrack by Sony, a behind-the-scenes book by News Corporation's HarperCollins, and will 
be broadcast on Time Warner's HBO (Rose, 1998). The television series Bus, the Vampire 
Slayer was produced by News Corporation's Twentieth Century Fox, broadcast on Time 
Warner's WB, and spawned a soundtrack CD released by Sony and a series of "novelizations" 
published by Viacom's Simon and Schuster. An analyst at PaineWebber noted that "These 
companies no longer make films or books. They make brands," lumps of content that can be 
exploited through a set of their own and other's distribution channels (The Economist, May 23 
1998). Ken Auletta describes the resulting skein of interconnected communications firms as a 
"global keiretsu" of mutual backscratching (1998: 286). Just as shifting coalitions of movement 
organizations routinely mobilize to bring off protest actions, the relevant unit of analysis for the 
media industry is the project: a one-time production (broadly defined) created by temporary 
alliances that may or may not be followed by similar productions, according to circumstance. 
Thus, the emergence of the late twentieth century media industry parallels the emergence 
of a social movement in several important respects. It evolved fiom a relatively stable 
configuration of powerhl incumbents through a period of turbulence in which challengers took 
advantage of exogenous shifts in the industry's opportunity structure to launch their alternatives. 
Challengers, often using organizational vehicles in adjacent industries (billboards, newspaper 
publishing, film production, and others) ultimately brought about the re-shaping of the media 
industry and the constitution of new rules of engagement rooted in innovation through 
collaboration. In this way, the media industry came to share important similarities with 
industrial districts, in which the "project" rather thanthe organization is often the more relevant 
unit of analysis when making sense of episodic production structures. 
Routine Movement Activity 
In their preoccupation with explaining the rise of broad national movements (Costain, 
1992; Mc Adam, 1982), "protest cycles" (Tarrow, 1989), or revolutions (Goldstone, 199 1 ; 
Skocpol, 1979), theorists of social movements could well be accused of focusing on the 
exceptional, rather than typical, in the study of collective action. Thus, one might argue that 
technological revolutions of the sort that have transformed the entertainment industry are rare 
events that are hardly typical of "normal" economic life. What, critics may ask, about more 
"routine" economic activity? 
In the contemporary democratic West, the modal form of movement activity looks very 
different from the broad, highly dramatic, often consequential episodes of national contention 
that scholars of social movements and revolutions have tended to study. In fact, against the 
backdrop of these exceptional episodes, one can discern a steady stream of more routine local 
movement activity. Drawing on recent literature (McAdam, 1998), we briefly sketch an analytic 
framework for describing this general class of efforts. In our view, such a framework should 
include a concern with: (a) the nature of local mobilizing structures; (b) the importance of 
culturally available collective action repertoires; and (c) the typical spurs to local movement 
activity. We take up each of these topics in turn. 
Local Mobilizing Structures. One of the keys to the emergence of national social movements 
or revolutions is what we have termed "social appropriation." By social appropriation we mean 
the processes through which previously organized, but non-political groups come to be defined 
as appropriate sites for mobilization. For example, in the case of the U.S. civil rights movement, 
it was the mobilization of black churches (and later black colleges) that keyed the movement's 
rise. But routine local mobilization does not depend upon or generally feature this kind of social 
appropriation. More often, local movement activity turns on the periodic activation of loose 
personal networks of "career activists." These networks are very likely to have arisen during a 
peak period of national mobilization of the sort we described in. the previous section.. But long 
after that'"protest cycle" has run its course, these loose networks survive, providing the 
mobilizing structure within which most local activism.gets generated. At times the nominal 
vehicle through which action gets generated will be a formal social movement organization 
(SMO), but more often than not these SMOs are little more than "paper" organizations with few 
~ members outside the network of "career activists" mentioned previously. 
This loose activist network is typically well known to city officials and other 
institutionalized segments of the community. So, for example, left activist networks in the U.S. 
will generally have fairly strong ties to liberal churches, social service agencies, local unions, 
and whatever institutions of higher education may exist in a community. Right-wing activist 
networks are also hooked in to local institutional spheres, but of a very different mix than those 
of their liberalllefl counterparts. Right-wing networks can be expected to have fairly strong ties 
to conservative churches, veterans groups, and certain kinds of service organizations. 
We mention these overlapping network/organizational spheres because they constitute 
the fields within which most local mobilization takes place. The initial stimulus to action 
generally arises within the activist networks themselves, with the related organizational spheres 
providing available pools within which the activists can seek to assemble the "transitory team" 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1973) needed to stage whatever march, protest, vigil, petition campaign, or 
other collective action they have in mind. The contrast with the broad national movements or 
"protest cycles" discussed above is stark indeed. Whereas the latter constitute a clear departure 
from normalcy, the kind of periodic local mobilization we are discussing here is very much 
"business as usual," embedded as it is in fairly stable interpersonal/organizational networks and 
well understood culturaVbehavioral routines. 
Culturally Available Collective Action Repertoires. A second key element in social 
movements is what Tilly (1995: 41) called the "repertoire of contention," that is, "the ways that 
people act together in pursuit of shared interests." Although straightforward sounding, there is 
an interesting cultural problematic inherent in the selection and application of forms of 
contention. As Tilly put it back in 1978 (p. 151): "[alt any point in time, the repertoire of 
collective actions available to a population is surprisingly limited. Surprisingly, given the 
innumerable ways in which people could, in principle, deploy their resources in pursuit of 
common ends. Surprisingly, given the many ways real groups have pursued their own common 
ends at one time or another." When it comes to real world collective action, the seeming vast 
variety of action forms turns out to be quite limited. In the final analysis, all groups are 
constrained in their choice of tactics by the forms of contention culturally available to them. By 
culturally available we mean two things: (1) that the group has some working knowledge of the 
form, and (2) that the form enjoys a certain cultural legitimacy within the group. The first of 
these constraints-what might be termed the informational constraint-has been noted by any 
number of analysts (Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978, 1992, 1995), but the second has been largely 
absent from writings on the concept of repertoire. But, in our view, illegitimacy constrains as 
surely as a lack of knowledge (cf. Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Thus, even if a group knows of a 
tactic and perceives it to be effective, it will avoid using it if it sees it as culturally beyond the 
pale. 
Routine Mobilization of Organized Economic Activity 
What do local mobilizing structures and culturally available action repertoires have to do 
with economic production? We argue that episodic collective action rooted in the social 
networks of local players and taking the characteristic forms given in the local repertoire 
describes much contemporary economic activity as practiced in, for instance, Silicon Valley. 
"Industrial district" was Alfied Marshall's term for the spatially clustered networks of (mostly 
small) firms that concentrated on a specific industry or set of related industries. Sheffield had 
steel, Lyon had silk, and Santa Clara County, California has microelectronics. Industrial districts 
are distinguished by the fact that geographic boundaries supercede organizational ones in 
analytical importance. Piore and Sabel(1984: 32) describe the system in Lyon: 
The variability of demand meant that patterns of subcontracting were constantly 
rearranged. Firms that had underestimated a year's demand would subcontract 
the overflow to less well situated competitors scrambling to adapt to the market. 
But the next year the situation might be reversed, with winners in the previous 
round forced to sell off equipment to last year's losers. Under these 
circumstances, every employee could become a subcontractor, every 
subcontractor a manufacturer, every manufacturer an employee. 
The ability to size up the character of potential partners was regarded as critical to an 
individual's (or firm's) success. But perhaps more importantly, the district relied on aset of 
rules of fair behavior that constrained participants from taking short-term advantage of each 
other and favored the long-term vitality of the district. Such rules are not laws, and thus are not 
literally a property of a municipality. But nor are they properties of firms. Rather, they are more 
like an institution that provides mutual benefits to participants. 
Silicon Valley has many characteristics of an industrial district, as described in AnnaLee 
Saxenian's (1 994) book Regional Advantage. In the computer industry (broadly construed), 
rapid changes in technology and markets made it impractical for vertically-integrated firms to 
maintain a technical edge across all components. Specialist firms have little choice but to keep 
abreast of their area of specialization, both technically and in terms of price. According to Intel 
CEO Andy Grove, "Anything that can be done-in.the vertical way can-be done more-cheaply- by. 
collections of specialist companies organized horizontally" (Saxenian, 1994: 142). Thus, 
computer firms in the 1980s created collaborative relationships with their most important 
suppliers, all of which had a mutual interest in the success of the final product. Being located in 
the same geographical region facilitated frequent face-to-face contact and the development of 
trust. As in Lyon, the ability to size up potential partners effectively was critical for success. 
Again, shared understandings of the rules of the game (the local culture) made the construction 
of production networks feasible. The relatively short lifespan of any given project (e.g., a 
particular generation of a computer line) implied that partners were likely to meet again on the 
next round, further bolstering the incentives for consummate cooperation (cf. Axelrod, 1984). 
"The system's decentralization encourages the pursuit of multiple technical opportunities 
through spontaneous regroupings of skill, technology, and capital. Its production networks 
promote a process of collective technological learning that reduces the distinctions between large 
and small firms and between industries or sectors" and largely dissolving the boundaries between 
firms (Saxenian, 1994: 9). For instance, in creating Sun's workstations, "...it was difficult and 
somewhat pointless to determine where Sun ended and Weitek or Cypress [two of its suppliers] 
began. It was more meaninghl to describe Sun's workstations as the product of a series of 
projects performed by a network of specialized firms" (Saxenian, 1994: 145). Nearly any new 
firm can claim the advantage of state-of-the-art manufacturing simply by "buying" this function 
from a contractor, arguably creating a virtuous cycle of innovation. 
This project-based dynamic extends even to manufacturing: to a surprising degree, high 
technology "manufacturers" contract out much of the actual assembly of their products to firms 
specializing in manufacturing. Formerly known as "board stuffers;" firms- such as Flextronics, 
SCI Systems, and .Solectron do.much.of the assembly for '.'original equipment: manufacturersly . 
(sic) such as Hewlett Packard and Sun Microsystems and enable start-ups to grow rapidly by 
providing a ready manufacturing base. Contractors routinely manufacture products for 
competing OEMs, but this is seen.as having a collective benefit for the larger community as well 
as individual firms: "All of Solectron's customers benefited from learning that would formerly 
have been captured only by individual firms. Moreover, lessons learned in manufacturing for 
firms in one sector were spread to customers in other sectors, stimulating the diffbsion of process 
innovation from industry to industry" (Saxenian, 1994: 154). Considering again Demsetz's 
question "when is a nexus-of-contracts morefirm like?', some commentators are driven to ask 
whether all of Silicon Valley itself (rather than any of its constituent) is properly thought of as a 
"firm" (Gilson and Roe, 1993). By Saxenian's account, it is this boundarylessness that is largely 
responsible for the economic success of Silicon Valley, whereas the bounded firm, mass 
production culture of Route 128 in Massachusetts is to blame for that region's waning 
performance in high technology. 
The high technology production networks of Silicon Valley might have taken on any 
number of forms. In practice, however, these networks follow a relatively constrained set of 
repertoires. As Mark Suchman's work shows, local law firms, particularly Wilson Sonsini 
Goodrich & Rosati in Palo Alto, acted to compile "pre-processed infusions of relevant know- 
how." "Such information intermediaries act as interorganizational pollinators-monitoring 
various pools of constitutive information, determining which structures are 'appropriate' for 
whom, and compiling summary conclusions in the form of neat, cognitively coherent templates 
for action" (Suchman, 1998: 49). Law firms acted as veritable computer dating services, 
matching entrepreneurs, managers, technical talent, and capital suppliers for new ventures from 
within the broader social network of the Valley. The governance structures of these projects (as 
indicated by venture capital financing contracts) became increasingly homogeneous over time, 
particularly within. Silicon Valley compared to other locations (Suchman, 1995). 
In short, the recurrent mobilization of episodic production through networks of economic 
"activists," following locally familiar (and legitimate) repertoires, directly parallels the routine 
mobilizations of social movement activists. The production of new firms, like the production of 
social movements, takes the form of routinized, episodic collective action. 
Conclusion 
The traditional focus in organization theory on corporations as bounded, sovereign, 
countable units of social structure (Scott's [I9981 "high modernism") is a poor fit with the 
emerging nature of the new economy. We identified two trends in particular as undermining the 
applicability of traditional organization theory: the increasingly "boundaryless" nature of 
production processes, and the expanding scale and scope of financial markets and the resulting 
hegemony of their evaluative standards. Our critique of resource dependence theory and 
population ecology demonstrates the limits of describing the contemporary corporate sector in 
the United States using the vocabulary of organizations-as-units. Old constructs and 
mechanisms-such as organizational birth, death, structural inertia, and managing 
interdependence through mergers and interlocks-provide little explanatory leverage in a world 
of fluid production structures and hypertrophied financial markets. We also find the new 
(contractarian) theory of the firm in economics to be remarkably weak in characterizing changes 
in the American corporate sector. Although there can be little doubt that financial concerns are 
the North Star of corporate decision making, it is equally evident that the structure and evolution 
of the corporation result from political choices and social processes that the contractarian 
approach is ill-equipped to theorize. Making sense of the evolving structures of the new 
economy requires an approach that does not end with either organizations or markets alone. 
We have argued that social movement theory provides an approach that is more fitting for 
the post-industrial economy. Like contemporary production structures, the boundaries around 
social movements are fluid, and impromptu productions follow regular processes of mobilization 
among participants choosing from among repertoires of legitimate forms of collective action. 
We compared the emerging media industry to the emergence of a national social movement, and 
the network economy of Silicon Valley to the routine local movement activity. We found 
striking parallels. As anticipated by Zald and Berger (1978), forms of coordinated collective 
action, whether through "organizations" or "movements," are ultimately susceptible to the same 
'forms of analysis. As collective economic action becomes increasingly episodic, rather than 
following the routine forms of the integrated organization, the explanatory balance tilts in favor 
of social movement theory. Our argument, however, is ultimately to be judged on the 
fruitfulness of the work it stimulates. That is, will adopting the theoretical vocabulary of social 
movement theory lead researchers to ask more insighthl questions than a vocabulary that begins 
with organizations? We think it will, but to this point we have offered only two very broad 
phenomena-movement and industry emergence and the routine mobilization of local 
movement/economic activity-for analogous theorizing. We want to close the paper on a more 
modest note, by identifying specific research topics that might demonstrate parallels (and 
differences) between social movement and contemporary economic activity. 
The first centers on recruitment to emergent economic and/or movement activity. If 
much contemporary economic activity really is more ephemeral and network driven than 
traditional theories of organizations suggest, then the processes by which these "transitory . 
teams" (McCarthy and Zald) are assembled should resemble the network-based recruitment 
dynamics that have been the subject of so much social movement research (Briet, Klandermans 
and Kroon, 1987; Diani, 1995; Fernandez and McAdam, 1988; Gould, 1991, 1993, 1995; Kim 
and Bearman, 1997; McAdam, 1986; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993; Mische, 1998; Rosenthal et 
al., 1985; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson, 1980). Roberto Fernandez (Fernandez and 
McAdam, 1988; Fernandez and Weinberg, 1997) is the only scholar we can think who has 
analyzed network based recruitment dynamics for both emergent movement and economic 
activity, but we think there might be much to gain from approaching the study of participation in 
emergent economic projects using the conceptual frameworks and methodological tools 
movement researchers have developed in the study of movement recruitment. 
A second phenomenon that lends itself to a search for dynamic analogies between 
contemporary movement and economic activity would be the strategic framing and other 
"representational" practices of movement and economic entrepreneurs. In a post-industrial 
service economy, what is "produced" is often not material products per se but perceptions and 
identities. Earlier we described Sara Lee Corporation's decision to drop its manufacturing 
capacity in order to focus on managing its brands, which involves promoting perceptions of 
product quality and the social status of their purchasers. The "value added," in short, is 
perceptual, flowing from the creation of distinctive and desirable identities. The management of 
perceptions is aimed not simply at consumers of products, of course, but also at other participant 
groups necessary to make a venture work, including (actual and potential) employees and (actual 
and potential) investors--often using rather different messages. Because the nature of the 
product is perceptual, "external" evaluations in such contexts are based largely on social rather 
than technical criteria (cf. Thompson, 1967). (Internet-based startup firms are only the most 
extravagant example, in which employees are recruited on the basis of the venture's likely appeal 
to P O  investors, and investors are recruited based on the venture's likely appeal to consumers.) 
Social movements are similarly in the business of producing perceptions and identities. 
Contenders making claims on incumbents engage in performances to demonstrate that, for 
instance, they are willing and able to disrupt political decorum to get what they want. In a recent 
article, Charles Tilly (1998: 15) argues that one of the central challenges confronting movement 
actors, and, by extension, motivating much everyday movement activity, is the need to 
demonstrate WUNC; that a movement's constituents are worthy, united, numerous, and 
committed. Comparative ethnographic work on the fiaming and representational practices of 
movement and economic actors would help to tease out the similarities and differences in these 
two forms of action. 
A third prospective area for comparative research, following from the previous one, 
concerns the recent parallel ascendance of "associations without members" and "hollow 
corporations." We have described how virtually any hnctional aspect of a business can be 
contracted out to a specialist firm, allowing the spread of "manufacturers" who neither design, 
build, or distribute their products and employ few people. An analogous development has 
happened with the rise of issue-oriented interest groups and social movements. As Skocpol 
(1 999) describes it, civic involvement for many citizens in the United States once entailed 
membership in associations that held face-to-face meetings, elected leadership, and debated 
issues before coming to positions. "Leaders who desired to speak on behalf of masses of 
Americans found it natural to proceed by recruiting self-renewing mass memberships and 
spreading a network of interactive groups." Now, in contrast, "When a new cause (or tactic) 
arises, activists envisage opening a national office and managing association-building as wel1.a~ 
national projects from a center. Even a group aiming to speak for large numbers of Americans 
does not absolutely need members. And if mass adherents are recruited through the mail, why 
hold meetings? From a managerial point of view, interactions with groups of members may be 
downright inefficient" (Skocpol, 1999: 71). Potential members-at least those with more money 
than time-find benefits to this "hollow" form as well: "Why should highly trained and 
economically well-off elites spend years working their way up the leadership ladders of 
traditional membership federations when they can take leading staff roles at the top, or express 
their preferences by writing a check?'We anticipate that research on the dynamics of both 
hollow movements and hollow organizations will benefit from cross-fertilization. 
Our final candidate for the comparative study of movements and organizations involves 
research on the diffusion of innovative ideas, practices, and organizational forms. Recognizing 
the emergent nature of movement activity, movement researchers have focused considerable 
attention on the difhsion of the various innovations produced by the "early risers" in a given 
"protest cycle" (Tarrow, 1998). Some have studies the spread of new protest tactics (Soule, 
1995, 1997; McAdam, 1983; Meyer and Whittier, 1994; Tilly, 1995); others the difision of 
ideological frameworks (McAdam, 1995; McAdam and Rucht, 1993; Snow and Benford, 1992; 
Valocchi, 1998); still others the adoption of new organizational forms (Clemens, 1993). The 
diffusion of innovation has also been studied in the context of formal economic organizations, 
but to a much lesser extent than has been true for social movements. The reason: the general 
assumption of market efficiency has tended to obscure the role of social-cultural processes in the 
evolution of organizational characteristics and practices. The growing influence of the new 
institutionalism has begun to redress the neglect of this important topic, but we still feel that 
organizational scholars could benefit from the greater volume of empirical work on the topic by 
movement researchers. 
We have focused on the parallels between economic organization and social movements, 
but we must also note the fertile ground for traditional social movements provided by 
contemporary economic transitions under the broad rubric of "globalization." As financial 
markets globalize and the demands they make on business organizations become more exacting, 
corporate governance-the set of institutions that determine the balance of power among owners, 
managers, and other constituencies of corporations-becomes a pressing issue of political 
economy. As we argued above, these issues require political choices; for instance, the choice of 
whether to sell shares in a state-owned business, or whether to allow hostile takeovers, are made 
at the state level and therefore susceptible to popular influence. Both local and national 
movements have mobilized around issues of corporate governance raised by changes in 
ownership and control. In Germany, demonstrators pelted the CEO of steelmaker Krupp-Hoesch 
Group with eggs and tomatoes after Krupp announced a hostile takeover bid for rival Thyssen in 
March 1997. Shortly thereafter, 25,000 workers converged on Deutsche Bank headquarters in 
Frankhrt to protest Deutscheys part in helping to finance the bid, and ~ e r m a h  politicians 
successfUlly urged Krupp to abandon its foray into "cowboy capitalism" (Davis and Useem, 
1999). Almost 100 years to the-day after the 1898 US invasion of Puerto Rico, government 
workers led the biggest labor protest in the island's history, in which upwards of 500,000 
workers joined in a two-day general strike that included demonstrations and a blockade of the 
highway to the international airport. The cause was the Governor's imminent sale of a 
controlling stake in the state telephone company to private investors led by GTE (Wall Street 
Jounlal, July 8,  1998). Similar mass protests have accompanied the attempts of South Korean 
chaebols to restructure through layoffs. The International Monetary Fund had required the 
institution of labor market "flexibility" as a condition for its bailout of the Korean economy, and 
the new president sought restructuring of the chaebols in order to attract necessary foreign 
investment. As the imperatives of global political economy and corporate governance become 
increasingly merged, national and international social movements will have an increasing 
influence on the social structure of economic life. 
So much for our all too brief survey of potential topics for comparative movement/ 
organizations research. We do not claim that these topics exhaust those that might reveal the 
increasing relevance of social movement theory and research to an understanding of economic 
action. At the same time, we are not certain what systematic comparative research of the sort we 
are proposing here will show. We have been deliberately provocative in this article, not so much 
because we know for certain how far various social movement theories can be applied to formal 
economic organizations, but to force organizational scholars to confront the theoretical 
challenges posed by the third industrial revolution. It now seems beyond dispute that a sea 
change is taking place in the locus,.structure, and practices of large economic organizations. It 
seems just as certain that these changes are rendering traditional organizational theories less 
applicable to the realities of modern economic life. What theories will replace the older 
frameworks is not entirely clear. All we are calling for is a lively debate over the merits of 
various alternative perspectives. Social movement theory is one such alternative. 
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